Discussion on The Iraq Oil Law
by Fouad Al-Amir
(translation from the original Arabic with thanks to Raed Jarrar)
In the following notes, I wish to discuss the oil and gas law, dated on January 15, 2007, originally written in Arabic. My notes are based on the English draft presented by Farooq Al-Qasim, Thamir Al-Ghadhban and Tariq Shafeeq on July 2006 – which, apart from some points, could almost be considered the same as the Arabic version. The Arabic draft of January 15, 2007, refers to three annexes that are not included in the draft I have in hand. Those annexes are very important and actually part of the law. Despite the fact that all international agencies and newspapers said the Cabinet has approved the law and will pass it soon to the parliament for ratification, and that CNN said in its Arabic news bulletin, on January 28, 2007, that the Iraqi Parliament is scheduled to discuss the constitution draft on February 10, it is quite surprising to hear some of those concerned with this law claim the annexes have not been finished to this day (i.e. January 27, 2007). No one can accept the claims that they are unfinished until now. The only reasonable possibilities are either the annexes do exist but need to be approved by higher authorities inside or outside Iraq, or that they are complete and approved but those responsible would rather pass them under the table. There is also the, albeit, slim chance that the bill was passed to the national assembly without the annexes! Mind you, the English draft above had no as well. The secrecy and attempts to pass the law as if it were any other ordinary bill not only do they baffle, they also invite questions about what could be hatched in the dark and could place officials under serious and legitimate doubts.
Through a number of sources I laid my hand on a copy of the law I am discussing here. To the best of my knowledge, this bill is the final version and it is the one that will be passed to the national assembly. Once changes occur, notes will be changed accordingly.
Elaborating the notes is something more than just a word-for-word discussion of the bill’s articles. In order to guarantee an objective debate with references to my own observsations, the conditions in which the bill was penned, whether Iraq is in need of such a law now or in the near future, and what it should be like, have all been included in the debate.
My notes are as follows:
1. I think the Regional Government of Kurdistan’s take on the issue has a lot to do with the postponement of passing the bill to the national assembly. By the time the oil ministry spokesman said an agreement has been reached over the form of the bill between the central government and that of the Kurdistan region, international agencies and newspapers quoted Kurdish officials’ comments denying their approval of the bill. For instance, Mr. Ashti Hawrami, Minister of Natural Resources in the Kurdistan region (quoted in Al-Quds Al-Arabi January 1, 2007 , quoting the Financial Times), said, “No, we have not signed off on a draft of the proposed hydrocarbons law.” He also added “Several issues are not still resolved. The Ministry of Oil statement is unfortunately premature.” On January 31, 2007, Radio Sawa quoted Minister of Regions’ Affaires Mr. Muhammad Ihsan as saying, “The hydrocarbons law has not been decided yet… the differences hinge on the mechanism of signing off contracts in the Kurdistan Region and the role played by the oil ministry, the Regional Government of Kurdistan has not approved of the current bill.”
2. It is important to study the oil law draft. In the course of the notes, we will refer to it as “the Federal Law” in the light of the bill that was issued in the Kurdistan Region on September 9, 2006, which we will refer to as “the Regional Law”. It is quite important to study the Iraqi constitution and the insights of the committee drafting the “Regional Law”, particularly the articles concerned with oil and Kirkuk. Both laws had not been enacted simultaneously because there are major differences between them. Either the constitution or the two laws must be amended, especially “the Federal Law”.
Those issues might pose challenges for the provinces or the “next” federal regions if they want to have their own oil laws as is the case with the “Regional Law”. Practically speaking, this is what the permanent constitution allows for the regions or provinces. Obviously, any law enacted for provinces or regions must not contradict the “Federal Law”, otherwise tremendous chaos and production competition would ensue, and oil resources for this generation and generations to come would be wasted. A “Federal Law”, on which all the other laws depend, includes clear articles stipulating that the central government is in charge of deciding the way the hydrocarbon resources are used and has the final word on all the regionally and federally signed contracts. The question is, “is this possible in the light of the articles of the current constitution?”
3. What does the Iraqi constitution say in this respect?
Regarding the issue above, I would like to explain the following:
The interim constitution “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period” stated on the natural resources: Article (25) of the exclusive competence of the transitional government includes (E) which says managing natural resources is one of the “exclusive” competence of the interim government. B of Article (26) reads “Legislation issued by the federal legislative authority shall supersede any other legislation issued by any other legislative authority in the event that they contradict each other, except as provided in Article 54(B),” which pertain to the Kurdistan Region. The content of this article is crystal clear; it confirms the fact that it does not include the matters referred to in Article (25) of the excusive competence of the interim government.
The permanent constitution is totally unlike the point above, which is as follows:
A) adding regions and provinces in the text instigates some doubts!
B) Article 112 says, First, the federal and regional authorities shall be responsible for organizing and distributing the main electrical power resources in coordination with the regional government and distributing the revenues resulting from their sale through the national budget in an equitable manner proportional to the distribution of population throughout the country, and with due regard for areas that were unjustly deprived of these revenues by the previous regime, for dealing with their situations in a positive way.”
Article (112) second reads, ” The federal government and the governments of the producing regions and provinces together will draw up the necessary strategic policies to develop oil and gas wealth to bring the greatest benefit for the Iraqi people, relying on the most modern techniques of market principles and encouraging investment.” Article (114) the duties shared by the federal and regional authorities include customs, electrical power resources, drawing up environmental policy, drawing up general planning and development policies, drawing up general health policy, drawing up general education and childrearing policy, drawing up domestic water resources.
C) Article (115) limits the powers between the central and regional governments and says, “All that is not written in the exclusive powers of the federal authorities is in the authority of the regions. In other powers shared between the federal government and the regions, the priority will be given to the region’s law in case of dispute.”
D) The exclusive powers for the federal authorities, which are stated in Article (110) do not include natural resources including oil. Similarly, the development and planning policy and all the other issues written in (C) above of the joint powers do not include natural resources including oil, which makes it among the regional powers according to Article (115) above. Provinces and regions will have the final say over this issue.
E) Hence, we notice that regions and provinces have the final say over the oil policy, which provokes suspicions over intentions to divide Iraq. How could a state be run, when the regions and provinces have the final say over administering and investing its resources, which belong to today’s generations and those generations to come, as well as the general development and planning policy. Therefore, according to the constitution, any region (or province) could enact its own oil law. What would ensue are a destructive seemingly constitutional competition for oil production, political and financial corruption of the mafias running the country, which is demonstrated by the oil smuggling practices that are carried out under the noses of the occupation and Iraq’s riches will be wasted in all this mayhem.
4.Magnitude and Importance of Oil Resources:
The magnitude of the oil resources the “Federal Law” is referring to and the current and future conditions surrounding the oil market in the world reflect the importance of scrutinizing the law and not hastily passing it under the table or under any pressure or occupation’s influence, which will be benefiting the most off this law. Besides, Iraq has been going through dire social and security problems which does not make coming up with sound resolutions possible.
4-1) Figures the law is talking about:
Iraq’s fixed uncovered oil reserve is estimated to reach 115 billion barrels. Experts believe the actual reserves are much higher. After inspections, Iraq’s oil reserve could reach 250 billion barrels.
We are talking of 115 billion barrels in 71 oil fields, only 24 of which are currently used. The known oil reserve is in the neighbourhood of 70 percent.
The uncovered oil fields since order 80 of 1961 (which nationalized all the lands that were not used by the international companies at the time), were found by Iraqis who worked alongside contracted Russian, French and other foreign companies, who were providing technical support. Baghdad Pact, which was doomed the day it was born in the late 1960s tried to twist order 80 and involve foreign companies. The current law is doing just the same.
Below is a table that includes information about ten uncovered and unused oil fields. They will be used as an example on the oil resources for sale according to the Federal Oil Law.
No. | Oil Field | Reserve (Billion Barrel) | Production Capacity (1000 barrel/day) | Estimated Development Cost (USD Billion) |
1 | Majnoon | 21 | 600 | 4 |
2 | Western Qurna | 15 | 700 | 4 |
3 | Eastern Baghdad | 11 | 200 | 0.8 |
4 | Ibn Omar | 6 | 470 | 3.4 |
5 | Al-Halfaya | 3.5 | 230 | 2 |
6 | Ar-Ratawi | 2 | 180 | 1.3 |
7 | Nasiriyya | 2 | 300 | 1.9 |
8 | Tooba | 1 | 150 | 1.25 |
9 | Al-Gharraf | 1 | 100 | 0.7 |
10 | Al-Ahdab | 0.2 | 100 | 1.3 |
62.7 | 3030 | 20.65 |
The table shows the huge size of the resources in those ten oil fields alone, which have not been used and will be announced according to this law.
If the current oil price is 50 USD/barrel (which is 20 dollars less than early last year’s), the total revenues of the ten oil fields would be $3782 billion and $55.3 billion of annual revenue. If we increase the revenue to 60 USD/barrel, which is quite possible, those fields would reach $3782 billion and $66.4 billion of revenues. Common sense says that we should divide a revenue rate of 80 USD/barrel by the production life-cycle, which, at best will resume in the second decade of the 21st century. So the ten oil fields will be worth $5016 billion and $88.5 billion of annual output. Those figures are related to the 62.7 billion barrels, not the uncovered and unused reserves.
Hence, it shows that we are talking about big money that is involved in the proposed law. This should make us wary of our serious responsibility towards history, which should make us come up with the right decision over the law that will be enacted, based on the worsening political, economic and security situations in Iraq, let alone the corrupt officials, who, as acknowledged by the Integrity Commission, have penetrated into all aspects of life. Moreover, all the decisions made by all the Iraqi governments will be under the mercy and pressure of the large oil companies owned by the occupation, whose limitless capacities is capable of buying people’s conscience. Therefore we cannot let such a law pass, we must keep a watchful eye and warn against the drawbacks of this law.
4-2) All politicians, economists and specialists are aware of the fact that the world’s oil resources are running dry and they will have to cut production rates, because oil will be quite scarce by the mid 21st century. The world’s fixed oil reserve has reached 1100 billion barrels, which will do for no more than 40 years to come, if we keep the current consumption rates. The majority of the new reserves were uncovered about 30 years ago. Despite the thorough and constant investigations, the reserves that had been uncovered on a yearly basis throughout the past two decades do not even cover half the annual consumed quantity, i.e., we are using the oil that had been uncovered earlier. It is not expected to uncover more than 20 percent of the current reserve. When will oil production reach its peak is the question that has caused disputes. In other words, when will oil producers find themselves forced to reduce the daily production rate because oil fields cannot provide enough. This could last until 2010 to 2015, though some optimists believe it could last to 2020. Acting according to the global warming Kyoto Protocol, in which carbon dioxide emission could be reduced, could help us last to 2020.
Oil will be priceless. If OPEC could survive and coordinate with the other major producers such as Russia, prices will skyrocket and even if they drop, no serious problem would loom, it will be in sync with rationing production rate and limiting the OPEC exports quota. It is key to not yield to the industrialized states, the U.S. topping the list, which will advocate increasing products in the market as Saudi Arabia used to do. Presently, Saudi Arabia does not have the capacity to flood the market; its production rate is at its peak. The only state that could do so is Iraq. Yet, if it does, it will be the first to drown, it would make prices drop, and Iraq will not earn high revenues despite the massive production rate.
5) Investments and the required production:
Granted good faith exists amongst the Iraqi officials who wish to pass the oil law, which includes Iraqi and foreign investments through “Sharing production contracts”, we will see later they base their argument on the massive need for high-tech investments to upgrade the Iraqi oil fields, something the rundown Iraqi economy is unable to provide. They also talk of the rapid expansion in production because the Iraqi economy is in a desperate need for cash to manage the Iraqi budget. Therefore, we must respond to these claims through the following notes:
5-1) In November 2004, the former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi laid down an oil policy that could be summed up like this; the present oil fields are run by the state of Iraq (The National Oil Company). The new fields will be used with the help of private local and foreign investments, without involving the State’s funds. He also laid down a production plan, in which he emphasized the need to reach a daily crude oil production rate as high as 3.5 m barrel/day, which was the case earlier. This could be done within the present fields and as quickly as 2 years from the date the policy was proposed in November 2004. Afterwards, production capacity could be increased to reach 8-6 m barrel/day within five to seven years. This policy was doomed the day it was proposed due to a majority of No votes among Iraqi political powers. Also, international companies were not in favour of investing in the light of a temporary policy with no legal guarantees.
When we talk of increasing production rate, we must dwell on the talks held before the invasion between the U.S. State Department and Iraqi and international experts. International newspapers talked about indications for U.S. plans to take over the Iraqi oil, destroy OPEC and breach OPEC’s so-called Price “Monopolizing” Policy. One of those indications is a statement made by Archie Dunham, CEO of the oil giant Conco Philips before the invasion, “we know where the best oil fields are located; we wish to lay our hands on some of them.” Shell, too expressed its intentions to be physically present in Iraq. A large number of Iraqi experts opposed the destruction of OPEC and emphasized on keeping the organization to maintain Iraqi rights and empower prices. Thus, the U.S. policy has not resorted to overt attempts to destroy OPEC. Rather it contrived to encourage Iraq to increase its production rate, which would consequently flood the market, whether by itself or alongside Saudi Arabia. Presently, the industrialized states are pressuring Saudi Arabia to raise the prices from 50 to 55 USD/barrel, regardless of other OPEC members’ disapproval, who want the price to range from 60 to 70 USD/barrel.
The oil market is still sensitive to supply and demand. OPEC’s increase or decrease of supplies to 0.5-1.5 m barrel/day could keep the prices fixed. In early 2006, oil prices have reached 75 USD/barrel. Nowadays, it has dropped to 52 USD/barrel. For long periods of time, the price kept staggering around 60 to 65 USD/barrel.
In 2006, the OPEC price limit was worth 22 to 28 USD/barrel. Owing to the fact that the organization had intervened to prevent a price downfall, which by the late 1980s reached 10 to 20 USD/barrel. In the 1990s, the average price was 15 USD/barrel, at times it dropped to 10 USD/barrel. In 2004, prices leaped to $40-50, in 2005 $60 and then to 70-75 USD/barrel. Neither Saudi Arabia nor any other oil producer was able to flood the market. By 2005, the latter reached the peak of its production capacity of 9.5-10 m barrels. Moreover, prices were on the rise due to massive and ongoing increases of imports to China and India. Also, the emergency fuel reservoirs in the industrialized states, particularly in the United States, were on the increase as well. Throughout the past three years, it has become clear that oil products have limits, whether now or in the future. Practically speaking, it is not possible to flood the market as before. Saudi Arabia has been working hard to increase its export capacity to 12 million (instead of today’s 10 million) within three years. The Gulf States are trying to have a 2 barrel/day increase. Yet those increases are not enough to cover the expanding consumption (particularly in China and India), the oil depletion in the North Sea and Alaska and the incompetence of Azerbaijan and Central Asia to expand.
5-2) What is the proper policy for production plans?
In my view, the proper annual production and exported quantities are quite sufficient now to provide annual cash, only when the Iraqi government spends the money on upgrading the industry, development plans and covering the Iraqi budget.
For instance, with a 3 million barrels/day exporting capacity, if the revenues are 50 USD/barrel, the annual sum the Iraqi government receives would be $54.75 billion. If the price is 60 USD/barrel, which is exactly what the OPEC should do (particularly Venezuela, Iran and Libya) the annual revenues are estimated to reach $65.7 billion. As far as I am aware , Iraq’s expenditure will not exceed this figure within the next five years based on the fact that the defence budget, which receives more than half the State’s budget, will be dwindling. Furthermore, when security is restored and foreign investors are allowed to do business in the oil industry, like refineries, oil products marketing, petrochemicals and chemical fertilizers (which are exempted in the Federal Law, but included in the Regional Law as will be explained later), there will be high-priced foreign and local investments alongside the aforementioned figures.
After developing new fields, if the exporting capacity is 5 million barrel/day, which are expected to start producing five years from now with a slight average of 60 USD/barrel in revenues, since in five years’ time, the annual revenues are estimated to worth $110 billion or $153 billion if the price is 70 USD/barrel. Yet, if we follow the former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s plan, which is exactly what the occupation and international companies have in mind, the annual revenue could reach as high as $175 and $204 billion U.S. Dollars. With the foreign investments at hand, the Iraqi State cannot spend such large amounts of money. Though this could lead to a massive monetary reserve, which means spending trends could emerge. As was the case during the Baathist reign the military and security agencies could be allotted large sums of money. More could be squandered on unnecessary services. Creditors could rush to get hold of their alleged debts. Most importantly the imperialist superpowers will start new wars and drag Iraq into them, which would fleece the state to undermine it just like what happened to the Gulf States.
The drafting committee which had penned the Federal Law could argue that “we are expanding the exports” and at the very same time an article of this law stipulates the production of foreign investments must be rationed according to the needs and plans of the State of Iraq. Which is pretty funny; why should we expand production and indulge foreign capital in this vital industry and run the risks of high debts? And then we do not make use of this exporting capacity, which, once used, the world’s oil prices will drop and we will earn less revenues, which we could easily get with the production rationed. Besides, we will have problems with international companies, which entail other problems with their governments, who will oppose cutting production rate. Of course there will be political, economic and military pressures, lavish bribes will be paid, corruption will prevail to make the Iraqi government and officials turn a blind eye on totally or partially rationing production.
This proves the fact that expanding production is against the interests of Iraq. The optimum solution is to gradually increase the production capacity according to a timetable set by reasonable spending, taking into account the encouragement of foreign investments (with Iraqi public or private contributions) in the oil non-production-related industries and others like manufacturing and developing agriculture and services. Russia is an eye-opening example. During Yeltsin’s rule, the Russian government permitted oil investment. At the time, corruption prevailed and mafias controlled the government’s decisions, which impoverished the Russian people. Putin’s government tried to correct these mistakes by renationalizing the oil production lines. He even said, “We will allow foreign investments in all sectors except oil production and gold digging.”
We deduce from the above that the Iraqi government must return to its old production state. Within the three coming years, exports could be gradually increased from 1.9 to 3.4 million barrel/day. The uncovered and undeveloped fields could be upgraded with the exports revenues, without having to involve foreign or Iraqi private sector companies in order to climb up to 6 million barrel/day. Coordination could be made with OPEC to act according to the Iraqi quota and talk the organization into increasing the quota on the expense of the other members because of the different situation Iraq has been going through. If extra money is needed, which is unlikely, borrowing can be made from banks or states that are in a bad need for a guaranteed source of oil such as China, India, Asian States or even Europe in return for oil exports.
5-3) Problems of the required investments:
To reach an exporting capacity of $3.4 billion divided on two or three years we need less than $4 billion. In other words, our annual need ranges from $1.5 to $2 billion. This could be made available from Iraq’s current revenues. During this time, other fields will be gradually upgraded by the National Oil Company. According to the aforementioned table, we will need $20.6 billion to increase production to another 3 million barrel/day. It could also reach 25 billion falling into five or six years, i.e. an average of 5billion USD/year. Money could be obtained from the increasing export rate, on the assumption that the international market is not flooded or it could be taken from loans borrowed from states that wish to have a guaranteed oil supply.
It is worth noting that we are against involving any foreign or local private capital in the oil industry. Foreign investments though could be used in post-production processes or in small uncovered fields or potentially oil-rich lands. Economy-wise, when it comes to comparing offers and signing off contracts for oil-rich areas, it is better to do business with state-owned companies of Asian or European origin that are in a desperate need for oil. Steering clear of American companies is advisable given the fact that they could cause non-stop problems for Iraq. The oil companies lobby in the United States is so influential that could mobilize governments against any demands made by a democratic Iraqi government to make changes to contracts that could serve the Iraqi interests. With such conditions, Iraq will always have problems with the US, undergo threats of war, boycotts or rifts, because we are living in the epicenter of the restive Middle East. Reading Daniel Yergin’s book “The Prize” gives an idea of what U.S. oil companies could do. They actually run after the giant oil fields that we think should be run by the Iraqi government. They will do whatever it takes to make sure the foreign investment law applies to giant oil fields. The U.S. administration is so weak and constantly tries to avoid any accusations over oil as their only motivation for waging the war in Iraq. Some could argue that Saddam had given giant fields to foreigners, like Majnoon to France, Western Gurna to Russia and Al-Ahdab to China and so on. It was wrong as well, but Iraq had reasons at the time, the Iraqi government thought that by doing so it could influence the Security Council to end the sanctions. It was more like bribes on a governmental level. By and large, these contracts have not done the trick.
This paragraph is an attempt to bring to an end my comments on the need for investments and the too much talk about how it could upgrade Iraq’s oil fields and how difficult it is to borrow money to carry out such projects. I already referred, in passing, to several solutions but I will elaborate on the most reasonable of the lot, in my view, which could be of use to both oil managers and the Iraqi State. It is pure and simple and based on the assumption of a dire need and vested interests between the borrower and the lender, as in the following hypothetical example:
Suppose, ‘A’ (Iraq) owns a very important substance which is very much in demand particularly in the near future (oil). ‘A’ does not have enough money to produce oil; once he starts producing and exporting he will have plenty of money. Meantime, another one in the world ‘B’ (China) has a surplus of cash that is worth much more than the local and international investment opportunities. China has to buy massive amounts of oil (it is currently consuming 7 percent of the world consumer rate). China’s consumption of oil will be on the increase. Once B gets into a luxurious era, the needs to buy cars, transports and energy and build a strategic reservoir would emerge. It has limited resources and has to rely on exports. It is now buying oil at international rates. Sometimes it exerts tremendous efforts to get hold of it, even if it has to pay a bit more than the usual prices. B is aware of the fact that it might need to cover its future needs by buying at prices much higher than the international ones because of political and economic factors that are in favour of its opponent the U.S. therefore it needs oil to flow now and in the future and to be sold at international rates. Moreover, when it gives the loans to Iraq, B needs to make sure it will get its money back with interests, just like the case with international banks and guarantee Iraq’s oil.
Thus, we see how the borrowing equation works between China and Iraq. Both governments could sign treaties, according to which Iraq asks China for a loan, and China works on developing one of the finest oil fields (like Al-Ahdab, which had been given to it earlier). The loan is to be returned with interest as well as a small premium percentage (1-1.5 percent). The treaty includes a regular contract for providing technical services (i.e. Iraq buys material and services from China) which could be an encouragement for the latter. The treaty also stipulates that after the termination of the works, debts are paid off in the form of oil. It could be for the best of Iraq’s interests to increase the exports in order to accelerate the payback. Even when the entire debt is paid, the treaty guarantees an Iraqi oil flow to China at international rates (Iraq’s standard prices) for ten to 12 years to come. This way Iraq’s problem is solved. It will start working directly, preserve the nationalized oil and steer clear of sharing contracts. Rather the contracts will all be based on providing regular technical support. Selecting China or any other similar state could make sure none of the international companies would stick their noses in Iraq’s domestic affaires. By the same token, it could also keep China rest assured for the fact that it is doing business with a small country like Iraq instead of the international companies. China is currently working on developing such treaties with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and India. It is also looking for oil in Africa. Though China has been looking all over the world for oil sources, it will not find a place better than Iraq, given the fact that there will be a huge uncovered field like Al-Ahdab. Similarly, Iraq will find several funding resources in Asia and Western Europe, but China would be the best of the lot. The Iraqi government and the oil ministry did want to develop the fields without signing off sharing contracts. All they need is look for such funding resources and make them a success. Consequently, Iraq’s oil fields would be maintained and the nationalization law is kept unscathed.
6) The Oil and Gas law no. /2007
In the course of this paragraph, we will try to explain the Federal Law and dwell on the Regional Law when necessary.
6-1) It is worth noting that political and economic incentives were behind accelerating the law, which emphasizes involving foreign investors in the oil industry, which is not stipulated in the laws at play. Oil has been nationalized and all oil-related processes are run by the public sector. Controlling oil is the reason behind the occupation and the U.S. presence in the region. The United States of America cannot consider Iraq an official colony so that it can go right ahead with investing. That is why it wanted Iraqis to come up with a law that could abolish all the previous nationalizing laws, which had not been enacted without counter imperialism deadly struggles. Since the early days of the invasion to this day, America has not been able to lull Iraqis, even their staunchest allies who were in favour of privatizing the oil sector, into doing so. In September 2003, a Foreign Investment Law was drafted. It was passed under the table during the reign of the former Governing Council, in which the oil sector was exempted. Article 6A says, “Foreign investment may take place with respect to all economic sectors in Iraq, except that foreign direct and indirect ownership of the natural resources sector involving primary extraction and initial processing remains prohibited.” Despite the exclusion, this law was doomed; Iraqis voiced their resentment to it through articles, seminars and local newspapers, let alone the fact that it does not have legal grounds, for it was passed through an unelected “Iraqi” authority, which is deemed illegitimate. Furthermore, the bad security situation makes it impossible for investments, even those who claim the legality of this law agree on that. Then the former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi (who has been so close to the Americans) in November 2004 came up with what he called “Outlines for Iraq’s new oil policy”. According to his policy, Allawi tried to begin with signing contracts with foreign companies. Claiming that this was included in the powers bestowed upon his government, he insisted on going ahead with the plan despite the public disapproval. Even the companies in question greeted it with dismay, for it was nothing but a dead letter, given the fact that the government lacked legitimacy. During the reign of the elected government in late 2006, resolutions permitting foreign investments, except the oil sector, were taken by the Kurdistan Parliament and the Federal Parliament. Typically, the foreign investment law was passed to the Federal Parliament without submitting it to public scrutiny. The bill was announced only after the final voting on it, and so it was passed under the table. Dubious plans to pass the oil bill are underway and shrouded with secrecy.
One thing begs the question; why the rush when it comes to enacting the oil law and setting a deadline for the need to have it done? Had it been a matter of just increasing the export capacity, it is possible to work on the currently functioning fields to get back to the old 3.5 million barrel/day capacity without having to come up with a law or involve foreign investment. Had it been the need for new refineries, which goes without saying, it is possible to do that without drafting such a law, or through the foreign investment law, with the consensus of the Iraqi people. The only clear answer comes from recent American officials’ statements. In January 2005, the international Monetary Fund stated that the IMF staff emphasizes the need for pressures towards structural monetary reform, which include urgently drafting a new oil law. In July 2006, U.S. Secretary of Energy Sam Bodman confirmed that Iraqis need to enact a new hydrocarbon law, according to which foreign companies could invest. Condoleezza Rice too said, in October 2006, that what Iraqis need is the hydrocarbon law because petrol is the largest resource of income to this government and that all Iraqis must believe that oil will be used for their own interests, not for the interests of the sectarian parties! It seems Condi does not have the faintest idea about Iraqis’ concerns. Concurring with her is the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, who in November 2006 claimed that they were helping Iraqi leaders to complete their pact and that the basic political powers need to make tough decisions within the coming weeks…enacting the oil law could make Iraqis share the revenues in a way that could unify the country, which is extremely important. The Americans have tirelessly tried to impose the oil law, David Satterfield, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq emphasized, in November 2006, that Iraq must enact a national law for hydrocarbons, which will guarantee equitable distribution of the national resources amongst Iraqis, which could ensure large-scale investment in this sector. The Baker (Republican) -Hamilton (Democrat) Commission, which represents the institutional side of the American government, had not forgotten to touch on this issue. Their December 2006 report says, “The U.S. government should provide technical assistance to the Iraqi government to prepare a draft oil law that defines the rights of regional and local governments and creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment. Legal clarity is essential to attract investment.” It also says, “The United States should encourage investment in Iraq’s oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies.” It also asks President
Bush to make public statements that reject the notion that the United States seeks to control Iraq’s oil.
The U.S. policy has failed in Iraq. Though they succeeded in destroying Iraq and driving a wedge between its countrymen, their power was not strong enough to apply their imperialistic schemes. Now they found themselves forced to find an “honourable” exist strategy from Iraq that could “save their face”. The U.S. Administration believes that it is the right time to pass the oil bill. They do not have enough time to wait, particularly with the domestic U.S. pressures, whether the Democrats win the mid term elections (only because of Iraq) or because a lot of Republicans abandoned the Bush policy, which has tarnished America’s reputation. The situation in Iraq has taken its toll on Iraqis, who have repeatedly voiced their indignation (even those who once welcomed the occupation). As far as the Americans are concerned, this dismal situation could help pass this law, particularly if the process is shrouded in secrecy. Unfortunately, the Iraqi government and some political powers have linked their future and that of Iraq with the American occupation, which they want to appease and support. They are ready to compromise key issues that could be solved later as they have been lead to believe. In addition to that, the international economic institutions linked to the United States and the pro-globalization institutions (immoral capitalism) like the IMF, the World Bank and the U.S. Treasury, all those are working on incorporating openness into the Iraqi economy during this dismal situation. They have threatened to not write off Iraqi debts and not offer help. Mind you, Iraq’s biggest debt comes from the war compensations to Kuwait, which have not been written off despite the ongoing bloodletting and the difficult living standards we have been facing. Iraqi laymen wonder when they will be compensated for damages caused by the occupation.
Bush wants to achieve a strategic victory through passing a law that could lead to the end that brought him to Iraq regardless of the reasons he declared. Despite his military and political defeats, he will get oil. Enacting the oil law and translating it into signed contracts must be a fact before the termination of his term in office. The contracts may not get into force now, but the law ensures the implementation later. This is why the duration articles in the Federal Law were made lengthy and flexible so that they could be extended. Besides, the law must be passed through the current government and parliament. The Americans might need to replace the government, if the crackdown fails, which is quite expected. When the chips are down, a national salvation government will be declared. It will abolish the constitution, declare two-year martial laws, and dismantle the parliament, just like Ayad Allawi said on American TV. When that happens, there will not be a legal cover to pass the law. Bush and the American oil companies, which are responsible for bringing him to office, said they wanted the oil drilling processes, in particular. They are after “THE PRIZE” This reminds us of a Sunday Star Times editorial, which said, “For the international oil companies, Iraq is the uncaught gem on the Middle Eastern crown.” We think Bush and the American oil companies will not be able to get THE PRIZE or the GEM. The law they want to pass under such conditions would harm Iraq’s interests and Iraqi’s oil processes-related expertise. Passing the law cannot be done at a time Iraqis cannot decide their own and the next generations’ fate under the rule of the occupation, with insecurity, poverty and corruption spreading like wildfire. Therefore, Iraqis will work hard on abolishing it regardless of all the criminal disputes the occupation has hatched.
6-2) Forms of oil fields development contracts:
In order to understand the articles of the law, we need to briefly dwell on the methods in which oil fields development projects could be implemented. By and large, the methods fall into three types. Within these, we find sub-types that we will touch on without getting into details.
According to this method, the government makes all decisions, implements all works and gets the entire revenues. Foreign companies could be involved, but their role is no more than providing services in different processes which are included in one contract of regular Technical Service Contracts for a specific work, within a limited duration at a limited pay. This method had been used in Iraq since the nationalization of oil in the early 1970s. It is used in the majority of Gulf States.
Technical Service Contracts come in different shapes. They have been developed to meet the financial requirements or need pertaining to experience or certain political or economic conditions. They look almost like method C below.
First/ Risk Service Contracts
According to this type, the foreign company provides funds to invest in the development operation. When production is in full swing, the company is paid back for the money it provided earlier plus a fixed pay for every barrel that comes out of the production line. This way, the company could increase profits by increasing the production. Meanwhile, the company must bear the risks of failure, particularly when prior investigations are not conducted. This method was used in Algeria when it first started producing. It works fine on the uncovered fields.
Second/ Buyback Contracts
This contract type was developed by Iran in the 1990s to upgrade a number of oil fields. Such contracts are similar to the Risk Service type above but they have shorter durations, which could last from three to five production years after two to three years of development. By the end of the duration, the national oil company is handed over the field and keeps all the revenues. Foreign companies are paid in oil barrels not in cash, which could be calculated according to the investment percentage the company had offered. A percentage of the revenues must be ensured after agreeing on reaching specific production rates that are written in the contract. The company here too bears the risks in case the production does not reach the rates agreed upon.
Third/ Development and Production Contracts
These contracts are similar to those Iraq signed during the 1990s with a number of states in a bid to end the UN sanctions and gain political support. Yet they had not reaped the expected fruits. None of the parties involved could carry out the development operations and violate the sanctions. Some of those contracts were operating in Al-Ahdab field (with Chinese companies), Western Gurna (Russian corporations), Al-Amara (Vietnamese company) and attempt to complete production partnership contracts with French companies like Elf (Majnoon oil field) Total (Ibn Omar field) and contracts with Italian and Spanish companies (Nasiriyya field) and a Korean-Chinese-Australian corporation (Al-Halfaya field) and Austrian, Japanese and Chinese companies (Eastern Baghdad), Indian, Algeria and Indonesian (Al-Toba) and others. None of them could achieve the objective sought. None of them could violate the sanctions. The whole thing was nothing but producing oil; for America oil production meant crossing red lines at the time.
Development and Production Contracts look a lot like those of production sharing. Sometimes they are more of wordplay just to avoid referring to the production sharing contracts, which are unwelcome in the nationalized industry, particularly when it comes to using the large uncovered fields like Majnoon, Western Gurna, Eastern Baghdad or others.
According to those contracts, foreign companies could invest in developing oil fields for limited durations (10-12 years). Afterwards, the fields are handed over to the national oil company or Iraqi oil companies. The foreign investor keeps providing services according to the Technical Services Contracts for as many as 15 years. In the course of the contract duration, the foreign company maintains the right to buy oil at market prices or at discounts. The contracts set the limits for the Iraqi government’s sharing of the company’s capital. They also set the profits shares the companies get from the produced oil. This contract type could be improved if an article is added to show the possibility of reconsidering the terms within a reasonable period of time, like every four to five years.
B)Concession: Sometimes it is called the Tax and Royalty System. Governments grant concessions to a company or a group of companies (consortium), which are either private or state-owned foreign companies. The concession includes a license for oil prospection, which will be owned by the company once it is extracted. The company pays taxes and royalties in return. The state could be an associate in the consortium, this is what we meant by improving concessions. These days such contracts are hardly used. They are thought to be imperialist residues.
C) Production Sharing Agreement:
Scrutiny is required when it comes to reviewing this type of contracts (and similar types mentioned above in point 6-2 A). The majority of questions and objections against the oil law stem from such contracts, which are thought to be pivotal to the Regional and Federal Laws. In this contract type, the government owns the oil when it is not extracted yet. When it is produced, the government is deemed to have “nominal” ownership of it. The company owns a share in it once it is extracted.
Iraq is one of the states which had sacrificed a great deal for nationalization. It has established a strong local base to develop and expand the oil industry by itself. Yet, it has a very large untouched oil reserve, let alone the possibilities of other to-be-uncovered oil reserves, which is the reason behind all the difficulties and tragedies Iraq has been undergoing to date. Some international experts and politicians would say, “Had bananas been Iraq’s source of income, no one would have cared to look at it.” Thus citizens, particularly those working for the oil industry find it quite erroneous to give up on nationalization and let foreign companies share their wealth. They have always worked so hard to counter this option. This applies to major oil producers of the world. International oil companies and their governments had no other choice but find an alternative, this type of contracts was the one.
In theory, the production sharing contracts (and similar ones) are the perfect system for oil relations. The State is in full control of the oil (no clashes with nationalization and national sovereignty). Foreign companies (including consortiums, which could involve state-owned foreign companies) produce oil according to specific contract terms. Practically speaking, the state’s work and supervision is so limited in this type of contracts. In Abu Dhabi, September 10, 2006, Deputy Premier and Chairman of the oil law committee Barham Salih was quoted as saying, “Personally, I am in favour of the production sharing agreements. We have to ensure a maximum increase in profits and revenues for the Iraqi people.” Thomas Wald of the University of Dundee describes these contracts as, “an appropriate marriage, they tend to give governments political satisfaction and the foreign company business satisfaction. The government is portrayed as if it is running the show. The company could run the show too through the legal phrase that refers to the emphasis on maintaining national sovereignty. Caution must be heeded when it comes to the oil law. Explicit contracts must be confirmed in order to preserve our rights. The regional law proved successful in this regard.
According to this type, the foreign company provides the funds needed for the first step, the investigation processes, and for the next step, the drilling operations and completing the basic structure for a ready-to-produce-and-export oil field. The company’s money is refunded by allocating a share of the first oil production, known as Cost Oil. Once the company has its money back, the remaining oil is called Profit Oil, which is divided between the state and the company. Typically, taxes are imposed on the company’s shares of profit oil. The company also pays a Royalty for the produced oil. They could also pay other bonuses set by the contract. Sometimes the state contributes to the company’s capital and becomes part of the consortium, which is contracting with the state.
The duration of the implementation process, percentages of royalties, production oil and profit oil shares, the way the state controls the spent costs or the production plans and processes are all written in the contract. All the contracts that were signed in the 1990s stipulate that the company receives 40-100 percent of cost oil for refund, whereas the state receives 60-92 percent of profit oil. Of course those percentages must always be altered in a way that could be for the good of the state, particularly after 2004, when oil prices skyrocketed so much that such percentages look too generous. For instance, the company takes 30 percent of profit oil, the state 70. When the revenues are worth $20 per barrel, the companies get 6 USD/barrel. When a barrel is worth $50 (production cost almost fixed) the companies receive 15 USD/barrel instead of the $6, i.e. double and a half more thanks to the increase in oil prices. Therefore, an article that stipulates reconsidering these contracts after a specific period of time (4-5 years for example) must be added. The current contracts do not include articles about profit oil sharing (profits). Rather they tend to speak of the Internal Rate of Return. According to past international contracts, the state contributed to 10-50 percent of the companies’ capital.
Finally, it is worth noting that high oil reserve states like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait and the Emirates (Iraq too is supposed to be on the list) do not have production sharing agreements. The number of such contracts in Venezuela and Russia is declining; there are serious efforts to put an end to them.
In Iraq, it could be quite beneficial to sign production sharing agreements for the small uncovered fields or lands that have not been subjected to oil inspections, once the contract forms are carefully studied. We hope Barham Salih’s comments were meant to refer to such fields or some of those which are being operated on in Kurdistan. He is not referring to the large fields like Majnoon, Gurna or eastern Baghdad.
According to the information we have, the Regional Government of Kurdistan has signed four production sharing agreements. In April 2003, they signed off contracts with the Turkish company Petoil, in January 2004 with Turkish Genial Energy, June 2004 Norwegian DNO and June 2005 Canadian Western Oilslands.
Those agreements probably provide small percentages of oil and generous offers to the companies.
6-3) Texts of oil law under discussion:
Despite the fact that I already said there is no need or ability to enact the oil law under the current conditions in Iraq, I will comment on the proposed bill.
My notes are as follows:
Article (2) excludes “refining oil, manufacturing gas and their industrial uses, and storing, transporting and distributing oil products.” The law does not explain why the above were excluded, are they still going to be nationalized or are there chances for enacting a new law for them? It does not make any sense for the foreign or private sector companies to be involved in the production processes (which are highly lucrative), but they do not take part in the next aforementioned processes, which could include petrochemicals and chemical fertilizers manufacturing, in addition to building large refineries that could cover Iraq’s oil needs and the exports (with limited profits, which is quite reasonable for industrial projects). Conversely, what should be done is not to involve the foreign and private sector companies in the production but they could take part in the other processes.
Therefore, we think all the post-production processes must be included in this law. It is worth noting that the regional law of Kurdistan does include that in Article (4) of the law, which applies to all the oil processes, none of which are excluded.
B) Article (1):
This article says exactly what Article (111) of the constitution states. As we noted earlier in point (3), there are several other articles in the constitution stated by the law in the obligatory terms section). At the end of the day, it is the oil producing provinces and federal regions that have the final word on the oil policy. Therefore, all the articles that say the federal authorities have the final say (including the parliament) contradict the constitution, some of which are all the articles under section five powers of authorities, article 6 the national oil company, article 7 ministry of oil, article 8 rehabilitation, development of and drilling for oil and gas, article 9 granting licenses, article 20 constraints over production standards and many other articles that give the final say to the federal authorities.
It is important for the federal law to include an explicit article that prohibits applying any article that contradicts this law all over Iraq. Article 77 of the regional law of Kurdistan stipulates the same, which means the regional law is prioritized over the federal law. This means chaos, especially if the other regions and provinces enact oil laws as we said earlier.
Constitution-wise, this law cannot be passed. Certainly, both laws cannot be passed simultaneously for they contradict each other. Yet if they do, it would seem like the Iraqi citizens are being ridiculed and any constitutional court could have them vetoed.
C) Article 6B Second refers to the national oil company’s operations. It says the task of this company is to develop, manage and operate the uncovered undeveloped fields, mentioned in annex 2, assigned to it as well as the functioning fields.
Annex 2 is not available. It seems the fields in question are those included in point 4-1 herein, 47 fields, which are uncovered and undeveloped. It probably refers to all those fields or some of them. Point A of Article 6 says the national oil company is a holding company and fully owned by the Iraqi State. We think that:
The annex must include all the uncovered unused fields.
The law should stipulate that these fields are developed either directly or according to Technical Service Contracts (see 6-2 A) i.e. there is no foreign or Iraqi private sector capital. This is important for the giant and medium previously uncovered fields. If not all fields are included at least the largest 25 of them.
D) Article 8-d is the most dangerous gap of the law, the Trojan horse that could access and control our oil resources. This article rivets on developing the uncovered undeveloped fields. It says, “It is permissible to develop the fields in question with the help of reputable oil companies…and according to the contracting terms.” This could open the door to monopolies operating under pretexts of developments.
E) The obligatory terms say, “The public sector, which is directly or indirectly affiliated to the oil sector needs support and promotions in order to be able to develop this sector.” Also, “Since upgrading and developing the oil industry will be backed by international and local investors, which have accredited practical technical and management skills as well as active financial resources…” Same thing holds true for the other articles such as article 9 which talks about granting licenses to foreigners and Iraqis (private sector).
The above shows that foreign and Iraqi private sector companies are allowed to invest in the oil production processes, claiming that this is because of the need for financial investments and state-of-the-art techniques. Personally I do not see any reason to involve Iraqi capital in this investment. The obligatory terms are so wrong and so against the Iraqi reality. Which technically skilled Iraqi persons or companies that are going to invest or could add up to the potentials of the oil ministry or the national oil company? None! The only ones who have abundant cash are those who had worked with the ex regime or profited off the years of war and sanctions, even those do not have enough money. As for their oil-related technical and management skills, their skills pertain to nothing but oil products stealing and smuggling. Involving Iraqis in this sector is just a ploy on the part of the foreign companies to make the most of their connections to some personalities who can grant them licenses or those who have links to statesmen or political parties who could help them get the licenses. This is why bribes and power abuse are spreading like wildfire. It is ludicrous that in 2004 Shell wanted to hire a liaison for international relations with Iraq to help the oil giant have access to the Iraqi government decision makers. In their vacancy ad they said, “Shell is looking for an incumbent of Iraqi descent, who has strong family ties and an insight over the major family networks in Iraq”!
I reiterate the fact that we are talking billions of dollars in investments or revenues. Foreign companies are not banned from giving shares to Iraqis who help them get authorizations or from involving the Iraqi private sector in the projects. Some could argue that the private sector is more able and active in bringing oil loans to Iraq than the public, as was stated in the former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s oil policy, which is far from reasonable.
Therefore, I think it is better to ban private sector from operating in the production processes. Yet it could be involved in the following operations.
As for foreign investment, I have already stated my opinion on it in 5-2. It must not be involved in production. If foreign investment has to be involved, it must only be in the post-production processes or investing in the small uncovered oil fields or would-be-oil-fields lands.
F) State’s contribution (article 12)
Article 12 A reads, “The government of the Republic of Iraq is committed to a true national participation in managing and developing its oil resources based on article 111 of the constitution. As for the English version of the bill, which was issued on July 2006, instead of referring to article 111 of the constitution, it added, “to promote the national control.”
Article 12 D reads “The Republic of Iraq maintains the right to participate in the oil processes in any of the stages according to the articles and terms of the contract.”
The law is talking about “real” participation as in article 12 A and about “maintaining the right” in article 12 D. There is no explicit mention of financial participation in the company’s capital, which will be awarded the tender. True participation means high investment in the company that will be awarded the tender, this must be explicitly stated in the law. There must be an article that reads, “The Iraqi government’s contribution to the company that will be awarded the license is necessary and must be worth no less than….”
Here a reasonable figure for the contribution, which must be no less than 30 percent (though 30 percent does not entail the ability to control the company), must be added. Yet if the field in question is a medium uncovered non-producing one (with a 0.2 billion barrels in reserve) the minimum contribution could be 45 percent. Yet if the reserve is 0.5 billion barrels, the contribution must be no less that 51 percent in order to have a “true” control.
Note:
We also noted the numbering in the draft is not precise; for instance article 12 is divided into أ, ب, ت, ث, ج which is incorrect. The Arabic numbering must be أبجد, هوز, حطي…, whereas other articles used the latter numbering method in the same draft. It seems translators used different methods. Article 12C refers to article 12-4, there is not a 12-4, it must be referring to 12d.
Using numerals is more appropriate in writing laws. For instance in article 12, we say 12-1, 12-2, 12-3,… etc, and if there are sub-articles in the main articles we write 12-1-1, 12-1-2,…etc.
G) Article 13 prospection and production:
First, when licenses for lands that have not been uncovered or undergone prospection, are given, the quantity of the oil reserve is unknown.
The article shows that the exploring, prospecting, developing and producing processes are all carried out according to one contract, which has a primary respite of no more than four years. Then a two-year respite is given (provided basic achievements are made within this period of time). “The board in charge could also give a third two-year respite for prospection,” as stated in Articles 13B 1 and 2 and 13D. Article 13-C reads, “In case prospection resulted in finding anything, the owner of prospection and production license maintains the exclusive right to conclude the processes…to appraise or set the commercial value of the extracted product…with a two-year extension for oil discoveries and 4 for gas.”
The extension periods are 4+2+2+2=10 years to stop limiting the quantities! (Without production). In fact, according to the contract, the license owner can do nothing within the first four years.
Second, Article 13C gives a contract term of 20 years to be extended for five years from the date of the agreement on developing the fields. Thus, the whole contract duration could last as long as 30-35 years.
I could not find any article that compels the contractor to waive 25 percent of the plot of land, of its choice, assigned for it after two years and another 25 percent after two other years. Yet, if oil or gas were found in more than 50 percent, only the remaining land is waived.
Third, we think the durations are too long and do not make serious work from the day the license is given possible. Such articles enable the license holder to avoid working under the current conditions Iraq is going through; therefore enacting oil and gas law will not be necessary.
I cannot see how the terms and clauses could protect the Iraqi party without knowing the exact amount of reserve. The foreign company will insist on the risks posed by possibilities of insufficient reserve that could not cover the expenses. Then the Iraqi government will be compelled to relax the clauses.
Fourth, the draft of the Regional Law of Kurdistan has solved the above problems. According to this draft, the works fall into two types; exploration and prospection, with limited durations for each. During each, the contractor waives 25 percent of the lands every two years. It also stipulates signing a new contract (with the same company) for development and production works. Thereupon, enough information will be available to go ahead with a contract that protects the interests of both parties. Clear and precise terms were written for those stages to ensure the continuation, diligence and speed of the works. Moreover, the authorities of the Regional Government of Kurdistan could have all the information required, otherwise the license would be cancelled.
I think the articles of the Kurdistan Region’s law could be used and the durations must be reduced.
Note:
Definitions are key to drafting any law. They usually make the first article of the law. In the Federal Law, the definitions made article 4, whereas in the Regional Law, they made article 1.
Definitions must be inclusive, even if they take a large space. Studying any article, one could understand what it means by simply referring to the definitions. For instance, article 13 refers to the “license holder”, a person or party that is not included in the definitions. Adding to the ambiguity, article 33, implementation of counter corruption laws, (which is very important. It is not found in the English version of the Federal Law and was included only recently) refers to punishing the “authorized person”. Who this “authorized person” could be? It is not mentioned in the definitions. Rather, there is a definition for the “Iraqi person” and “foreign person”. I have no idea how are we possibly going to apply this very important corruption related article.
Furthermore, several definitions listed in the Federal Law are ambiguous or incomplete.
In my view, it is better and easier to incorporate the precise and comprehensive definitions listed in the draft of the Regional Law of Kurdistan.
H) Before elaborating on the Federal Law I would like to dwell on some notes on the Regional Law of Kurdistan. They are as follows:
First, obviously the drafting committee of the regional law comprises of professionals who are fully aware of the legal jargon. It is rumoured that the American Advisory Institution BFC Engineers’ Advisors was the one behind this law. In contrast, the Federal Law was drafted by the persons I mentioned earlier. With all due respect and recognition to their high technical and management skills and their legal backgrounds that could be enough for them to understand and maybe draft some articles, I still think they are not competent enough to write such a key internationally long-awaited law. I do not mean to underestimate their potentials; on the contrary, they are brilliant in their own domains.
Thus, the Regional Law (The English version I have in hand) is perfect, accurate, inclusive and maintains the Kurds’ interests. Unlike the Federal Law (the Arabic version of the final draft of January 15, 2007 and the English draft of July 2006) which lacks precision and inclusion.
Second, the Regional Law is compatible with the articles of the constitution, except the one pertaining to Kirkuk and affiliated areas, which the Regional Law named “the Disputed Territories”. The definition refers to article 58 of the interim constitution (which assigns solving the problem to the permanent constitution). It also refers to article 140 of the permanent constitution, which we discussed in point 3 herein, which set a deadline for coming up with a solution, December 31, 2007. Therefore, it is inappropriate to add it to the Regional Law, even on a temporary basis pending a solution. It is worth noting that practically speaking, the article included all the northern fields, with the inclusion of the infrastructure such as the exports pipelines leading to the ports. Though this may look like a temporary solution, it gives the impression of a lurking wish to change the situation on the ground. Article 22-2 reads like a threat binding the central federal government within 3 months after agreements with the Regional Government of Kurdistan, otherwise all articles are deemed valid. Practically, neither the central federal government nor the oil ministry were given any roles in the contract forms. All the above matters could provoke the reader, who understands federalism and the oil issue in a different way, including the author of the notes herein. Had the regional law been drafted differently and left the issue of Kirkuk and its oil fields after December 31, 2007, the law would have looked better. Mind you, this would not have harmed the regional government of Kurdistan.
Third, what seems to be best for the time being, the Regional Law must be adopted as a Federal Law, after removing the articles pertaining to Kurdistan and make a few changes and replace the regional authorities with the federal. It is my responsibility to reiterate the fact that the Federal Law is the reference for all the regional or provincial laws necessitates amending the constitution.
I) Article 5 of the Federal Law limits the powers of authorities. In article 5A, the parliament’s power is confined to the enactment of this law or any other gas and oil related law as well as approval of international agreements in this regard.
For instance, once this law is approved its job is done. If the law is enacted as it is now, it means the overall resources of Iraq are controlled by the executive authority, in other words, ‘The Federal Council for Oil and Gas’, chaired by the Prime Minister. The 25 members of this council include three ministers, governor of the Central Bank and five advisors appointed by the cabinet. It could approve agreements and contracts related to developing fields based on production sharing, which could include the 21 billion barrel Majnoon field, which is worth $1050-$1260b in today’s prices, or $750-900b worth western Gurna, or $550-660b worth Eastern Baghdad, without the parliament’s approval or even review. In contrast, in article 31-5 of the Regional Law, the ministry does not award any contract worth more than $50m without the approval of a committee formed by the government and the cabinet. In a large number of oil rich states, the law stipulates the approval of the parliament on oil contracts particularly concessions.
J) The law does not mention any figures for the revenues or percentages with the foreign companies, which international newspapers and agencies published. Those figures might emerge in one of the annexes. My speculations are they will not appear, that is why I cannot comment on them. Yet the following should be noted:
First, the Federal Law speaks of prospection and production contracts, but there is no mention of production sharing contracts in it. The thing is, the content of the law looks so similar to the notion of the latter. On the other hand, the Regional Law is straight and clear; it used the right terminology Production Sharing contracts. If prospection and production contracts are different from the production sharing contracts, that difference must be explained.
Second, in article 43, the Federal Law laid down a fixed royalty for all types of oil, 12.5 percent of the total production, which is quite reasonable and internationally used for medium and light types of oil. Article 42 of the Federal Law, on the other hand, sets the royalty according to the volume of oils; 7.5 percent for very heavy oils (less than API20), 8.5 percent from heavy to medium (API 20-30) and a maximum of 10 percent for medium and heavy (over API 30). Figures, particularly for medium and light oils are very low. Reducing royalty is good for developing those types, given that in Iraq we tend to neglect those types of oils, except the Gayara oil, which is consumed in limited quantities. The same article sets the maximum limits for cost oil deduction in the sharing contracts ranging from a maximum of 70 percent (for API 14 oils and less which are very heavy types) to 55 percent (over API 30 oils, medium and light). As I said, the Federal Law does not name any figures; we want them to be stated.
Third, though the Federal Law does not name any figures or percentages of sharing or profits, the Regional Law sets the way profits are calculated, which is based on giving reasonable percentages for the Internal Rate of Return, according to the wideness of the field, after appraisal. We think the reasonable rate could be no more than 15 percent.
K) Matters related to protection of Iraqi citizens and sovereignty:
Though the English version rarely mentions these matters, except in some articles, the final Arabic version included some of them. They look almost like, yet less clear-cut than those in the Regional Law. Apparently, the English draft has been presented to several people to say what they thought of it, and those that have already studied the Regional Law called for incorporating some items into the Arabic draft. The articles in question pertain to transparency, corruption fighting, termination of contracts, applying Iraqi laws, establishing an environment protection fund, applying all laws and regulations of state-owned offices such as health, environment, municipalities, taxes, preserving historical ruins and implementing oil ministry laws (national oil company) on the announcement and overseeing exploration and production and enabling the ministry’s interventions when technical, financial or legal disorders arise.
Those matters must be clearly written in the Regional Law, and they should be adopted.
L) In case the Federal Law goes into force without making the changes required or without heeding my notes, a major unsolvable problem could arise. Granted the situation improves in a way that makes work possible, there will be an awful lot of work and an abundance of oil, which could be so much more than the quantities set by OPEC. Quantities extracted from all fields must be rationed. The reduction rate could be very high, which could delay refunding the company’s money or gravely reduce its expected profits. How would the Iraqi side react to that? Is it going to compensate the companies or this could be deemed part of the risks or is it going to succumb to pressures and export quantities much higher than the OPEC named quota, which means prices would plummet and competitive wars amongst OPEC members would ensue. Consequently, prices will fall and maybe collapse.
M) The solution is pure and simple, new oil projects must not be signed unless the central ministry lays down and implements a plan, taking into consideration the developments of production and international consumption rate, in coordination with OPEC. We think, a clear article stating the above must be added.
The above proves that enacting a federal oil and gas law now is not necessary for Iraq; it is pressured to serve some foreign agenda. A Federal Law must be enacted once all the problems above are solved and under normal circumstances, when Iraqis are security-wise and psychologically able to make sound decisions.
Fouad Qasim Al-Ameer
Posted: February 20th, 2007 under Oil.
Comments: 7
Comments
Comment from Robert Baertsch
Time: 2007-02-23, 4.08 pm
Why don’t the Iraqis look at some existing oil agreements? The Norwegian government has had success in developing oil and preserving wealth within the country. With production costs at $1/barrel, they should be in the drivers seat.
Comment from Hani Lazim
Time: 2007-02-23, 4.20 pm
Dear Foad,
Greetings,
The Iraqi people need people like you, who know the subject, to write such informative article. Thank you for the good work. Best wishes,
Hani
Comment from deyary rakhtawan
Time: 2007-03-08, 12.09 pm
I donot think this law is sufficiently address Kurdistan people interest as the regional contracts will be revised by the council wich will have a shia majority. the law will only be a sucess if decision in the council be made in consensus and not majority vote.
Comment from Mark
Time: 2007-05-16, 9.22 pm
Excellent report. Keep up the excellent reporting.
Comment from Ron
Time: 2008-03-01, 10.49 pm
Oil will never go below $85 again. In 2010 oil will be over $250 a barrel and gas will be $10 a gallon. Even though reserves are rising which should make oil prices drop the fact they don’t drop in price is because the political tensions are rising. With that you will either buy a hybrid which will still be expensive to operate or ride your bike or take the public transit. There are ways to reduce your fuel cost.
Comment from David Nelson
Time: 2008-03-23, 9.54 pm
Are there any laws in Iraq that require certain information to be included in what are known at “MSDSs” or Material Safety Data Sheets? These are also sometimes called “SDSs” for Safety Data Sheets. They are a relatively standardized form that accompanies chemicals and lists certain requirements such as boiling point, exact chemical name, what to do in case of an emergency, labeling of chemicals, etc.
I am also interested in whether Iraq is considering joining the United Nations sponsored “Globally Harmonized System” or “GHS.” This effort will harmonize all SDS/MSDS information to be submitted from suppliers of chemicals to others in the supply chain. Most countries do not require this information be given to the public, however, they DO require the chemical information to be given to other chemical suppliers and/or those that will use the original chemicals to formulate other chemicals.
Thank you in advance for your help. David Nelson, President/CEO, Global Decisions, Inc. www.globaldecisions.com
Comment from Nael
Time: 2010-09-05, 3.19 am
Dear Mr.Fouad,
I am really happy to see your articles translated to English. I am sure that a lot of people will get high benefit from them. I had a chance to type some of your articles in Arabic!
And to further progress and innovation…
Regards
Nael Hamo
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